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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 

 
 
RE: Administrative Suspension for Failure to Pay License Fees Required by Rule 
410 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR) 
O R D E R 
The South Carolina Bar has advised that William Edwin Griffin has failed to pay 
his license fees for 2016. Pursuant to Rule 419(d)(1), SCACR, this lawyer is 
hereby suspended from the practice of law.  He shall surrender his certificate of 
admission to practice law to the Clerk of this Court by August 8, 2016. 
Any petition for reinstatement must be made in the manner specified by Rule 
419(e), SCACR. Additionally, if he has not verified his information in the 
Attorney Information System, he shall do so prior to seeking reinstatement. 
This lawyer is warned that any continuation of the practice of law in this State after 
being suspended by this order is the unauthorized practice of law, and will subject 
him to disciplinary action under Rule 413, SCACR, and could result in a finding of 
criminal or civil contempt by this Court.  Further, any lawyer who is aware of any 
violation of this suspension shall report the matter to the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel. Rule 8.3, Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers, Rule 407, SCACR. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
s/ John Cannon Few J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
July 15, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
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Appeal From Horry County 
The Honorable Larry B. Hyman, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 
The Honorable Kristi Lea Harrington, Post Conviction Judge 
Opinion No. 27648 

Submitted June 17, 2016 – Filed July 20, 2016 

REVERSED AND REMANDED  
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of 
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PER CURIAM: Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari from the dismissal of his
application for post-conviction relief (PCR).  We grant the petition for a writ of 
certiorari, dispense with further briefing, reverse the order of the PCR judge, and 
remand this matter for resentencing.
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
After a trial, petitioner was convicted of trafficking cocaine between twenty-eight 
and one hundred grams and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.  
Petitioner filed a timely motion for resentencing, which was denied after a hearing.  
Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.  State v. 
Castro, Op. No. 2012-UP-378 (S.C. Ct. App. filed June 20, 2012).   
Petitioner filed an application for PCR alleging trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object when the trial judge improperly considered petitioner's decision to 
exercise his right to a jury trial as a factor in sentencing petitioner.  The PCR judge 
denied relief, finding petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving the allegation.   
ISSUE 
Did the PCR judge err in finding petitioner failed to prove trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to object when the trial judge considered petitioner's decision 
to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial as a factor in sentencing 
petitioner? 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
In this case, petitioner was charged with four drug related offenses.  One month 
before his trial, the State offered to dismiss several of petitioner's charges and 
recommend a minimum sentence in exchange for petitioner's decision to plead 
guilty to trafficking between twenty-eight and one hundred grams of cocaine.  
Petitioner declined the offer, and a trial date was set for his trafficking charge.  
Immediately preceding the trial, the trial judge explained to petitioner that the 
State's plea offer was still on the table, stating the following: 
I have pre-tried this with your attorney, and I will tell you 
I am inclined to sentence on a plea [to] seven years.  I 
would not be so inclined in the event of trial.  Also, you 
would [sic] regardless of how this trial comes out, you 
would still be looking at the other three charges as well 
for which you could be tried and would be tried.  
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 . . . . 
 
Now, your attorney tells me that you do not wish to 
accept this offer by the State, that you want to go to trial 
on this charge, and ultimately for all the charges.  Is that 
what you want to do, [petitioner]?  Are you sure that's 
what you want to do? 
 
(emphasis added). 
 
Petitioner responded that he wanted to proceed to trial.  At sentencing, the 
following colloquy occurred: 
 
[The State]:  . . . . As Your Honor is well aware, 
[petitioner] was offered to plead to a 
minimum sentence last month.  He was 
arraigned. He chose to reject the plea 
offer. 
 
[Trial Judge]:   In addition, he was given the concession 
of dismissal of several other pending 
charges that have not been tried? 
 
[The State]: That is correct, Your Honor, if he pled 
guilty . . . . 
 
The State does not seek or request any 
mercy on this Defendant, Your Honor. 
 
[Trial Judge]:    [Petitioner], anything you want to tell 
me? 
 
[Petitioner]: (Nods in the negative.) 
 
[Trial Judge]:   [Petitioner], this is classified by the 
Legislature in this State as not only a 
violent crime, but a most serious offense.  
It has a no probation, no suspension of 
17 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                        
 
sentence clause in the sentence.   
You are different from these other 
defendants in that they have cooperated 
and they have acknowledged their 
responsibility for the crimes that they 
have committed. 
[Petitioner], this is, as I said, an
extremely serious offense.  The State has 
had to take you to trial on a case where 
there was overwhelming evidence of your 
guilt. The jury has found you guilty, and 
I sentence you to incarceration in the 
State Department of Corrections for a 
period of fifteen years. 
(emphasis added).1 
Trial counsel did not object at any point during this colloquy.  Trial counsel filed a 
timely motion for resentencing; however, at no point did trial counsel argue 
petitioner's sentence should be reconsidered due to the trial judge's improper 
consideration of petitioner's decision to exercise his right to a jury trial.   
The trial judge denied the motion for resentencing, giving the following reasons for 
his imposition of a long sentence: (1) there was overwhelming evidence presented 
at petitioner's trial, including a video recording of petitioner selling approximately
eighty-four grams of cocaine to a confidential informant; (2) the State might drop 
petitioner's pending charges if petitioner were given an "appropriate sentence;" and 
(3) in his opinion, fifteen years of incarceration was a mid-range sentence for 
trafficking. Additionally, the trial judge stated, "I certainly don't penalize anybody 
from going to trial . . . But acceptance of responsibility is, I believe, a valid . . . 
1 Two co-defendants were arrested for the same transaction as petitioner.  One of 
these co-defendants testified at petitioner's trial, revealing that, although he was 
originally indicted for trafficking cocaine, he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and 
received a sentence of three years' imprisonment. 
18 

 
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
consideration for [t]he Court."2 
On PCR, petitioner alleged trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the 
trial judge's consideration of petitioner's decision to exercise his right to a jury trial 
as a factor in sentencing petitioner. 
The PCR judge found trial counsel's testimony, "[I]t just never struck me that 
[petitioner] was going to be punished because we went to trial, and so I didn't raise 
it in that context" indicated trial counsel had a "valid strategic reason" for failing to 
object to petitioner's sentence on that ground.  Further, the PCR judge found 
petitioner "failed to demonstrate he would have received a different sentence if 
such an objection had been made" because the trial judge articulated a "number of 
factors" for petitioner's fifteen-year sentence, including petitioner's immigration 
status, petitioner's pending charges, and the overwhelming evidence presented 
against petitioner at trial. Accordingly, the PCR judge found petitioner did not 
meet his burden of proving the deficiency or prejudice required for a finding of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
applicant must show counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness; and but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability the 
result of the trial would have been different).   
Petitioner argues the PCR judge erred because the transcript of the pre-trial 
conference and sentencing colloquy reveal that the trial judge abused his discretion 
when he improperly considered petitioner's decision to proceed to trial as a factor 
in sentencing petitioner to fifteen years' imprisonment.  Petitioner further argues, if 
counsel had objected to the sentence on that ground, there is a reasonable 
probability the trial judge would have sustained the objection and modified the 
sentence, or, at the very least, the objection would have been preserved for 
appellate review. 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  When a 
trial judge considers the fact that the defendant exercised his or her constitutional 
2 On direct appeal, petitioner argued the trial judge abused his discretion by 
improperly considering petitioner's decision to exercise his right to a jury trial 
when sentencing petitioner.  The Court of Appeals held this issue was not 
preserved for review. 
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right to a jury trial as a factor in sentencing the defendant, it is an abuse of 
discretion. See Davis v. State, 336 S.C. 329, 520 S.E.2d 801 (1999) (holding 
counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the trial judge indicated the 
reason he sentenced Davis more harshly than two similarly-situated offenders who, 
unlike Davis, had pled guilty was because those offenders admitted their guilt); 
State v. Hazel, 317 S.C. 368, 453 S.E.2d 879 (1995) (holding the trial judge abused 
his discretion when the judge considered the fact that Hazel did not plead guilty in 
declining to grant Hazel's request for sentencing under the Youthful Offender Act). 
We hold the statements made by the trial judge clearly reveal he improperly 
considered petitioner's decision to exercise his right to a jury trial in sentencing 
petitioner. The PCR judge erred in concluding that, because the trial judge 
"articulated that [petitioner's] sentence was based on a number of factors," 
petitioner failed to prove he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance.  
Rather, a trial judge abuses his or her discretion when he or she considers the fact 
that the defendant exercised his or her constitutional right to a jury trial as a factor 
in sentencing the defendant. Thus, although evidence from the record of other, 
valid reasons for a sentence might aid an appellate court in determining whether 
the trial court improperly considered a defendant's decision to proceed to trial 
during sentencing, those other sentencing factors do not negate the abuse of 
discretion that occurs when one of the sentencing factors considered by the trial 
judge was the defendant's decision to proceed to trial.  See Davis, supra (holding 
the trial judge abused his discretion by considering the fact that the defendant 
exercised his right to a jury trial in sentencing the defendant); Hazel, supra (same); 
State v. Follin, 352 S.C. 235, 257-58, 573 S.E.2d 812, 824 (Ct. App. 2002) ("We
caution the Bench that a trial judge abuses his or her discretion in sentencing when 
the judge considers the fact that the defendant exercised the right to a jury trial.") 
(emphasis added); see also State v. Brouwer, 346 S.C. 375, 388, 550 S.E.2d 915, 
922 (Ct. App. 2001) (remanding for a new sentencing hearing pursuant to Hazel, 
supra, stating, "Although the [trial judge] herein also stated it had never, and never 
would, 'punish someone for exercising their right to a jury trial,' we believe the 
mere disavowal of wrongful intent cannot remove the taint inherent in the [trial 
judge's] commentary, especially since the record fails to reflect an otherwise 
appropriate basis for Brouwer's disparate sentence.").  Accordingly, regardless of 
the fact that the trial judge considered the overwhelming evidence presented 
against petitioner, as well as his his pending charges and immigration status, in 
sentencing petitioner, and, despite the fact that the trial judge stated he was not 
"punishing" petitioner for choosing to exercise his right to a jury trial, the trial 
judge unequivocally considered petitioner's decision to reject a plea offer and 
proceed to trial as a factor in sentencing petitioner.  This was improper. 
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Further, we find there is no evidence to support the PCR judge's finding that trial 
counsel articulated a "valid strategic reason" for failing to object to the trial judge's
improper consideration of petitioner's decision to proceed to trial in sentencing 
petitioner. See Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989) (stating that, 
in reviewing a PCR judge's decision, this Court is concerned only with whether 
there is any evidence of probative value to support that decision).  Instead, 
counsel's testimony from the PCR hearing reveals no strategic discretion was 
employed by counsel on this matter at all.  See Foye v. State, 335 S.C. 586, 518 
S.E.2d 265 (1999) (counsel's performance did not constitute valid strategy where 
counsel did not even consider the question and thus failed to use discretion in 
employing an appropriate strategy).
CONCLUSION 
Because trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the trial judge's improper 
consideration of petitioner's decision to exercise his right to jury trial in sentencing 
petitioner, and, had the objection been preserved for appeal, an appellate court 
would have held the trial judge abused his discretion, we hold the PCR judge erred 
in denying petitioner's application for PCR.  Accordingly, we reverse the PCR 
judge's denial of relief and remand for resentencing. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN, and FEW, JJ., concur. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Ronald Wade Moak, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2016-001018 
Opinion No. 27649 

Submitted June 21, 2016 – Filed July 20, 2016 

PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Sabrina 
C. Todd, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Ronald Wade Moak, of Camden, pro se. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent 
(Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
the imposition of a public reprimand with conditions.  We accept the Agreement 
and issue a public reprimand with conditions as stated hereafter in this opinion.  
The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
Facts and Law 
Matter I 
Respondent agreed to represent Client A on three matters for a flat fee of $2,500:  a 
criminal domestic violence charge, a Department of Social Services paternity case, 
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and a possible divorce.  Ultimately, respondent collected $2,785 in fees, but also 
represented Client A on an additional criminal domestic violence charge as well as 
an animal control charge.   
A few days after beginning the representation, respondent filed a divorce 
complaint and a motion for an emergency hearing on Client A's behalf.  Although 
respondent provided information for the domestic action, respondent did not 
provide him with a copy of the complaint.  The temporary hearing was continued 
because Client A's wife was incarcerated in another county.  Respondent did not 
seek to have the hearing rescheduled and did not adequately explain the status of 
the case to Client A.  When Client A later waivered on whether he wanted to 
pursue the divorce, respondent considered the matter abandoned but did not clearly 
communicate that to Client A.  At times, respondent's communications with Client 
A and his daughter caused Client A to believe the divorce action was proceeding.   
Respondent admits that, at times, he failed to respond to Client A's reasonable 
requests for information about the action.  He did not notify Client A when he 
received a 365-day benchmark notice from the family court or when the case was 
dismissed.   
Client A obtained a divorce with assistance from another lawyer.  Thereafter, 
Client A filed a complaint with ODC under the mistaken belief respondent never 
filed a divorce action on his behalf.   
Respondent admits that his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR:  Rule 1.3 (lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing client); and Rule 1.4 (lawyer 
shall keep client reasonably informed about status of matter and promptly comply 
with reasonable requests for information).   
Matter II 
Client B sought respondent's assistance with a child visitation issue.  Respondent 
recommended Client B reach a visitation agreement with the child's father which 
respondent could then submit to the family court for adoption as an official court 
order. Respondent agreed to represent Client B for $500, which included a court 
appearance and filing fees. The fee agreement was not reduced to writing.  Client 
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B understood respondent would file the visitation agreement upon payment of 
$350 with the balance due later.   
Client B paid respondent $350.  Respondent did not place the unearned fees into a 
trust account. He states he does not maintain a trust account because most funds 
he receives are earned fees. 
Client B and the child's father presented respondent with their handwritten 
agreement in late October or early November 2014.  Respondent advised he would 
immediately file the agreement so a hearing could be scheduled before the 
Christmas holidays.   
However, respondent did not file anything on Client B's behalf and did not 
communicate with her further.  Respondent did not respond to Client B's telephone 
calls or texts. Respondent admits he failed to communicate with Client B; he 
asserts his failure to communicate was due to personal problems related to his 
mother's death.  Respondent further states he did not know how to reach Client B 
after he lost contact with Client B's aunt who had referred Client B to him.   
In May 2015, Client B filed a complaint against respondent.  In January 2016, 
respondent refunded the $350 paid by Client B.   
Respondent no longer accepts domestic cases.   
Respondent admits that his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR:  Rule 1.3 (lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing client); Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall 
keep client reasonably informed about status of matter and promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information); Rule 1.15 (lawyer shall deposit into trust 
account unearned legal fees and expenses paid in advance, to be withdrawn only as 
fees are earned or expenses incurred); and Rule 1.16(d) (upon termination of 
representation, lawyer shall take steps to extent reasonably practicable to protect 
client's interests, such as refunding any advance payment of fees or expenses that 
have not been earned or incurred).   
Matter III 
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Respondent agreed to represent Client C in a state post-conviction relief (PCR) 
action. Client C was seeking relief from a conviction related to a pending federal 
charge and believed obtaining relief from his state conviction would help him
resolve his federal charge. Client C pled guilty on the federal charge and was sent 
to a federal prison in another state before his PCR action reached the docket. 
When Client C's case first appeared on the docket, respondent sought and received 
a continuance to explore having his client transferred for the hearing.  By the time 
the case was docketed a second time respondent realized an order of transportation 
was not possible. Although respondent asserts he unsuccessfully attempted to 
reach Client C's family, he never wrote Client C or attempted to call him to explain 
what was happening with his case. 
On June 15, 2015, Client C emailed respondent from prison requesting the status of 
his PCR action and he complained that respondent had not responded to 
communications from Client C's wife.  Respondent did not respond to the email.   
In July 2015, respondent represented Client C at the PCR hearing without advising 
Client C that the hearing had been scheduled.  Respondent did not advise Client C 
that the judge orally denied the PCR at the end of the hearing.  Respondent 
maintains that, after he received the written order several months after the hearing, 
he sent a copy of the order to Client C.  Client C reports he has not heard from 
respondent and still does not know the status of his PCR.   
The PCR order indicates respondent presented no evidence in support of Client C's
primary complaint against his guilty plea counsel.       
Respondent admits that his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR:  Rule 1.3 (lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing client); and Rule 1.4 (lawyer 
shall keep client reasonably informed about status of matter and promptly comply 
with reasonable requests for information).   
Respondent also admits his conduct in each of these matters constitutes grounds 
for discipline under Rule 7(a)(1) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR:  (it shall be ground for discipline for lawyer to 
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violate Rules of Professional Conduct or any other rules of this jurisdiction 
regarding professional conduct of lawyers).   
Conclusion 
We find respondent's misconduct warrants a public reprimand.1  Accordingly, we 
accept the Agreement and publicly reprimand respondent for his misconduct.  
Further, within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall pay the 
costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC and the 
Commission on Lawyer Conduct (the Commission).  Within one (1) year of the 
date of this opinion, respondent shall complete the Legal Ethics and Practice 
Program Ethics School, Trust Account School, and Law Office Management 
School. Respondent shall provide proof of his completion of each program to the 
Commission no later than ten (10) days after the conclusion of each program.   
PUBLIC REPRIMAND. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
1 Respondent's disciplinary history includes a letter of caution issued in 2015.  Like 
the current matter, the letter of caution also cites Rule 1.3 and Rule 1.4 of the Rules
of Professional Conduct.  See Rule 2(r), RLDE (fact that letter of caution has been 
issued shall not be considered in subsequent disciplinary proceeding against lawyer 
unless the caution or warning contained in letter of caution is relevant to the 
misconduct alleged in new proceedings).
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Paul Winford Owen, Jr., Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001060 
Opinion No. 27650 

Submitted June 23, 2016 – Filed July 20, 2016 

PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and William
C. Campbell, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.   
John P. Freeman, Esquire, of Columbia, for Respondent.   
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent 
(Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
the imposition of an admonition or public reprimand with conditions.  We accept 
the Agreement and issue a public reprimand with conditions as set forth hereafter 
in this opinion. The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
Facts 
By order dated October 27, 2015, respondent was sanctioned by the Honorable 
David R. Duncan, a judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
27 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
South Carolina, and assessed a fine of $5,000.00.  The sanction arose out of 
respondent's conduct in a bankruptcy court hearing held on August 25, 2015.  At 
the time of the hearing, the parties were in binding arbitration and respondent's
arguments were still under consideration by the arbitrator.  Nevertheless, during 
the bankruptcy hearing, respondent made arguments based on the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, 574 U.S. ___, 
135 S.Ct. 790, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015).  Respondent admits the arbitration 
proceeding was the sole forum before which to raise his argument under Jesinoski
and that he should not have presented the Jesinoski argument to the bankruptcy 
court. As a result of respondent's conduct, the bankruptcy court and opposing 
party were required to endure a proceeding which was groundless.   
Further, respondent admits that, at the hearing, he told Judge Duncan he was 
proceeding at the direction of the Bankruptcy Trustee when, in actuality, he was 
responsible for the argument.  Respondent later wrote a letter to Judge Duncan in 
which he called attention to his misstatement and apologized to all concerned.    
Respondent acknowledges the Court deserves no less than complete, candid 
disclosures which are truthful at the time they are made.  He agrees his 
misstatement regarding the Bankruptcy Trustee was not excused by his corrective 
disclosure in his letter to the bankruptcy court.   
Law 
Respondent admits that by his conduct he has violated the following provisions of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR:  Rule 1.1 (lawyer shall 
provide competent representation); Rule 3.1 (lawyer shall not bring or defend 
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is basis in law and 
fact for doing so that is not frivolous); Rule 3.3 (lawyer shall not knowingly make 
false statement of fact to tribunal); Rule 3.4 (lawyer shall not knowingly disobey 
obligation under rules of tribunal);  8.4(a) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer 
to violate Rules of Professional Conduct); Rule 8.4(d) (lawyer shall not engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(e) 
(lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice). 
Respondent also admits he has violated the following Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR:  Rule 7(a)(1) (it shall be ground for 
discipline for lawyer to violate Rules of Professional Conduct). 
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Conclusion 

We find respondent's misconduct warrants a public reprimand.1  Accordingly, we 
accept the Agreement and publicly reprimand respondent for his misconduct.  
Within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall pay the costs 
incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC and the 
Commission on Lawyer Conduct (Commission).  Within six (6) months of the date 
of this opinion, respondent shall complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program
Ethics School and shall provide proof of completion of the program to the 
Commission no later than ten (10) days after the program has concluded.      
PUBLIC REPRIMAND. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
1 Respondent's disciplinary history includes an admonition issued in 2007.  See
Rule 7(b)(4), RLDE (admonition may be used in subsequent proceeding as 
evidence of prior misconduct solely upon issue of sanction).  Further, in 2005, he 
entered into a deferred disciplinary agreement which cites some of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct respondent admits violating in the current matter.  See In the 
Matter of Toney, 396 S.C. 303, 721 S.E.2d 437 (2012) (Court can consider prior
deferred disciplinary agreement involving similar misconduct in concluding 
lawyer's disciplinary history demonstrates pattern of misconduct).   
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter Thaddaeus T. Viers, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001034 
Opinion No. 27651 

Submitted June 22, 2016 – Filed July 20, 2016 

DISBARRED 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and C. Tex 
Davis, Jr., Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.  
Dylan Ward Goff, of James E. Smith Jr., PA, of 
Columbia, for Respondent. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
the imposition of a definite suspension not to exceed three (3) years or disbarment.  
Respondent requests the Court impose the suspension or disbarment retroactively 
to April 11, 2012, the date of his interim suspension.  In the Matter of Viers, 397 
S.C. 517, 727 S.E.2d 27 (2012). ODC joins the request for retroactive imposition 
of the sanction. We accept the Agreement and disbar respondent from the practice 
of law in this state, retroactively to the date of his interim suspension.  The facts, as 
set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
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Facts 
Matter I 
On January 5, 2012, respondent was arrested and charged with Harassment 1st 
degree. In March 2012, respondent was indicted on the additional charge of 
Stalking. By letter dated April 3, 2012, respondent self-reported these criminal 
charges to ODC. As noted above, on April 11, 2012, the Court placed respondent 
on interim suspension. Id.
In January 2013, respondent was indicted on the additional charges of Petit 
Larceny and Burglary 1st. 
All of the criminal charges involved respondent's conduct and interactions with his 
ex-girlfriend. 
On January 8, 2014, respondent pled guilty to Harassment 2nd degree.  He was
sentenced to sixty (60) days in jail (to be served on weekends), one (1) year of 
probation, required mental health counseling, fees/fines in the amount of $133.90, 
and ordered to have no contact, either directly or indirectly, with the victim.  The 
remaining criminal charges of Stalking, Burglary 1st, and Petit Larceny were 
marked nolle prosequi on January 24, 2014.  Respondent has paid all fees/fines 
related to the guilty plea. 
Matter II 
Respondent was indicted on fourteen (14) counts of criminal conduct relating to 
his representation of Marlon Weaver.  On April 15, 2015, respondent pled guilty to 
engaging in a monetary transaction in property derived from unlawful activity 
which is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  Specifically, 
respondent admitted he engaged in a monetary transaction which had some effect 
on interstate or foreign commerce, the monetary transaction involved criminally 
derived property with a value of greater than $10,000, respondent knew the 
transaction involved funds that were the proceeds of some criminal activity, and 
the funds were in fact proceeds of mail fraud.    
On October 20, 2015, respondent was sentenced for the criminal conduct.  He was 
committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned 
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for a total term of thirty-seven (37) months.  Upon release from imprisonment, 
respondent was ordered to be on supervised release for a term of three (3) years.  In
addition, respondent is held jointly and severally liable for restitution in the amount 
of $875,000 to be paid to SafeCo Insurance Company.  Respondent is required to 
make monthly payments of not less than $1,000 beginning thirty (30) days after his 
release from imprisonment.   
Law 
Respondent admits that by his conduct he has violated the following provisions of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR:  Rule 8.4(b) (it is 
professional misconduct for lawyer to commit criminal act that reflects adversely 
on lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as lawyer in other respects); Rule 
8.4(d) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional 
misconduct for lawyer to engage in conduct prejudicial to administration of 
justice). Respondent further admits he has violated the provisions of Rule 417, 
SCACR. 
Respondent admits he has violated the following Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR:  Rule 7(a)(1) (it shall be ground for discipline for 
lawyer to violate Rules of Professional Conduct or any other rules of jurisdiction 
regarding professional conduct of lawyers) and Rule 7(a)(5) (it shall be ground for 
discipline for lawyer to engage in conduct tending to pollute administration of 
justice or bring courts or legal profession into disrepute or conduct demonstrating 
unfitness to practice law). 
Conclusion 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and disbar respondent from
the practice of law in this state, retroactively to April 11, 2012, the date of his 
interim suspension.  Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, respondent 
shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with 
Rule 30 of Rule 413, SCACR, and shall also surrender his Certificate of Admission 
to the Practice of Law to the Clerk of Court. 
DISBARRED. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of Harry Pavilack, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001400 
ORDER 
Following the filing of formal charges against him, respondent submitted a motion 
to resign in lieu of discipline pursuant to Rule 35, Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE), Rule 413, South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.  We grant 
the motion to resign in lieu of discipline.  In accordance with the provisions of 
Rule 35, RLDE, respondent's resignation shall be permanent. 
 
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this order, respondent shall surrender his 
Certificate of Admission to Practice Law to the Clerk of Court and shall file an 
affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing he has complied with Rule 35, RLDE.   
 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
July 15, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Harvey Breece Breland, Petitioner. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001819 
ORDER 
On September 4, 2013, the Court accepted an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent entered into between petitioner and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 
and suspended petitioner from the practice of law for one year.  In re Breland, 405 
S.C. 573, 749 S.E.2d 299 (2013).  In August 2015, petitioner filed a petition for 
reinstatement, which was referred to the Committee on Character and Fitness.  The 
Committee, following a hearing, issued a Report and Recommendation in which it 
recommends petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law.  The petition for 
reinstatement is granted. 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
July 15, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 
v. 
Roy Lee Jones, Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001639 
Appeal From Greenville County 

Robin B. Stilwell, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. Op. 5428 

Submitted June 1, 2016 – Filed July 20, 2016 

AFFIRMED 
Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for 
Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior 
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, 
both of Columbia, and William Walter Wilkins, III, of 
Greenville, all for Respondent. 
WILLIAMS, J.:  Roy Lee Jones appeals his convictions for one count of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor, one count of second-degree 
CSC with a minor, and two counts of lewd act upon a child.  Jones argues the 
circuit court abused its discretion by allowing the State's witness to testify as an 
35 

   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
expert in child sex abuse dynamics because the subject matter of her testimony was 
not beyond the ordinary knowledge of the jury, the State failed to prove the 
reliability of the substance of her testimony, she improperly bolstered the victims' 
credibility, and her testimony was highly prejudicial.  We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
During the period of sexual abuse, from 2004 to 2009, Jones lived with his 
longtime girlfriend (Mother) and her two daughters (Older Sister and Younger 
Sister) in different homes in Greenville County, South Carolina.  Older Sister was
fifteen years old and Younger Sister was ten years old when Jones first began 
molesting them. 
On June 24, 2014, a Greenville County grand jury indicted Jones on two counts of 
first-degree CSC with a minor, five counts of second-degree CSC with a minor, 
and two counts of lewd act upon a child.  The case was called for a jury trial on 
July 16, 2014.
Prior to trial, Jones informed the circuit court he intended to object to the 
admission of testimony from the State's proposed expert, Shauna Galloway- 
Williams, on the ground that her testimony would improperly bolster the victims' 
credibility.  The court indicated it would hear Jones's objection prior to the 
proposed expert testifying at trial.  Subsequently, during jury qualification, the 
court asked if any of the jurors had been a victim, or had a close relative who had 
been a victim, of a sex crime.  No jurors responded to the question.  The court 
further asked if any jurors had been personally accused—or had a close relative 
who had been accused—of a sex crime and, again, no jurors responded. 
At trial, Older Sister and Younger Sister (collectively "the Victims") described 
various incidents of abuse that started with Jones making inappropriate comments 
and fondling them, but eventually progressed to oral and vaginal intercourse.  
Older Sister testified that, when she tried to stop Jones, he would physically force 
her to comply, threaten to harm her and her family using witchcraft, and frequently 
offer her gifts and money to keep her from reporting the abuse.  Older Sister stated 
Jones sexually abused her over one hundred times.  In 2012, the Victims' aunt 
confronted Older Sister after Younger Sister disclosed that Jones had been
molesting her.  Following this conversation, Older Sister went to the police and 
reported that Jones had sexually abused her as well. 
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Younger Sister testified that Jones started sexually abusing her when she was 
going into the sixth grade. Jones's molestation began with fondling and progressed 
to vaginal intercourse, and Younger Sister ultimately contracted a sexually 
transmitted disease from him.  After Jones beat Younger Sister for refusing to have 
sex with him, she told Mother that Jones had been molesting her.  Mother, 
however, allowed Jones to continue living in the home and the molestation 
continued.  Younger Sister also testified that Jones would give her money and then 
take it back after sexually abusing her.  To prevent Younger Sister from reporting 
the abuse, Jones physically abused her and threatened to harm her family with 
witchcraft. 
Subsequently, Mother testified regarding her relationship with Jones as well as the 
circumstances under which the Victims reported the molestation to her.  According 
to Mother, Jones denied the reports when she confronted him, and she wanted to 
believe Jones because she loved him.  Mother was also concerned the Victims 
would be taken away from her if they went to the police.  In September 2008, 
though, Mother took Younger Sister to a doctor's appointment and learned 
Younger Sister had contracted a sexually transmitted disease.  The doctor asked 
Younger Sister if she was sexually active, and she just looked at Mother "asking if 
she should say." Later, when Mother confronted Jones at home, the two got into 
an argument and she left the house.  Mother indicated she finally kicked Jones out 
of the home in 2010. 
The circuit court then held an in-camera hearing during which the State proffered 
Galloway-Williams as an expert in child sex abuse dynamics to testify regarding 
delayed disclosures, the disclosure process, and behavioral characteristics of 
nonoffending caregivers. Galloway-Williams, the executive director of the Julie 
Valentine Center, testified as to her extensive training and qualifications in the area 
of child sexual abuse. On voir dire, Galloway-Williams was unable to recall 
specific citations to studies or articles addressing the reliability of delayed 
disclosure issues, but she indicated she could provide them and stated all of her 
training included the studies and articles as the basis of fact.  Moreover, Galloway-
Williams explained the textbook she uses to teach a class at the University of 
South Carolina Upstate referenced articles about delayed disclosures and 
nonoffending caregivers. In addition, Galloway-Williams confirmed that these 
issues are researched and published in articles in professional journals, subjected to 
peer review, and uniformly accepted and used by experts and professionals in 
counseling and treating child sex abuse victims. 
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Jones objected to Galloway-Williams testifying as an expert in child sex abuse 
dynamics, arguing the substance of her testimony was not beyond the ordinary 
knowledge of the jury or reliable.  Jones further contended her testimony would 
improperly bolster the Victims' testimony and was highly prejudicial.  The circuit 
court overruled Jones's objection, finding the proffered expert testimony is 
admissible in child sex abuse cases of this nature, and the subject matter of
Galloway-Williams' testimony is outside the common knowledge of the public as 
well as the jury pool in particular. 
Thereafter, the circuit court qualified Galloway-Williams as an expert in child sex 
abuse dynamics over Jones's objection and she testified before the jury.  During her 
direct testimony, Galloway-Williams testified in general terms regarding delayed 
disclosures, the disclosure process, and the responses of nonoffending caregivers.  
Nevertheless, Galloway-Williams did not specifically reference the Victims or 
Mother. On cross-examination, Galloway-Williams stated she never met with any 
of the witnesses in this case, including law enforcement, and her only knowledge 
of the case came from discussions with the solicitor's office one month prior to
trial. 
After the circuit court denied Jones's motion for a directed verdict, he took the 
stand in his own defense and denied molesting the Victims.  Jones testified that he 
was a large financial provider for the family and would give them all of his money.  
Jones claimed he eventually "got tired of" paying all the bills, with the rest of the 
family failing to contribute, and decided to move out of the home.  After Jones 
moved out, he stated Mother and the Victims still visited him often.  According to 
Jones, the Victims brought these allegations as retaliation for him threatening to 
press charges against Older Sister for stealing money from him.  On cross-
examination, Jones admitted to a prior conviction for second-degree CSC 
stemming from an incident during his previous marriage. 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Jones guilty of one count of first-degree 
CSC with a minor, one count of second-degree CSC with a minor, and two counts 
of lewd act upon a child. The jury, however, acquitted Jones of the five remaining 
indictments.  Following the verdict, the circuit court sentenced Jones to life 
without parole for first- and second-degree CSC with a minor and fifteen years'
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imprisonment, to run concurrently, for each count of lewd act upon a child.1  This 
appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."  State v. 
Jenkins, 412 S.C. 643, 650, 773 S.E.2d 906, 909 (2015).  "Generally, the 
admission of expert testimony is a matter within the sound discretion of the 
[circuit] court." State v. Cope, 405 S.C. 317, 343, 748 S.E.2d 194, 208 (2013) 
(quoting State v. Whaley, 305 S.C. 138, 143, 406 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1991)).  This 
court will not disturb the circuit court's admissibility determinations absent a 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 326, 577 S.E.2d 460, 
468 (Ct. App. 2003). "An abuse of discretion arises from an error of law or a 
factual conclusion that is without evidentiary support."  State v. Irick, 344 S.C. 
460, 464, 545 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2001).  "A [circuit] court's ruling on the 
admissibility of an expert's testimony constitutes an abuse of discretion whe[n] the 
ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair."  State v. Grubbs, 353 S.C. 
374, 379, 577 S.E.2d 493, 496 (Ct. App. 2003).  To show prejudice, the appellant 
must demonstrate "a reasonable probability the jury's verdict was influenced by the 
challenged evidence or the lack thereof."  Fields v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Orangeburg, 
363 S.C. 19, 26, 609 S.E.2d 506, 509 (2005).
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Jones contends the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing Galloway-
Williams to testify as an expert in child sex abuse dynamics because the subject 
matter of her testimony was not beyond the ordinary knowledge of the jury, the 
State failed to prove the reliability of the substance of her testimony, she 
improperly bolstered the Victims' credibility, and her testimony was highly 
prejudicial. We disagree. 
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise."  Rule 702, SCRE. The circuit court must 
1 Prior to trial, the State served Jones with notice of its intent to seek life without 
parole due to his 1985 conviction for second-degree CSC. 
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consider the following three-prong test before allowing the jury to hear expert 
testimony: 
First, the [circuit] court must find that the subject matter 
is beyond the ordinary knowledge of the jury, thus 
requiring an expert to explain the matter to the jury.  
Next, while the expert need not be a specialist in the 
particular branch of the field, the [circuit] court must find 
that the proffered expert has indeed acquired the requisite 
knowledge and skill to qualify as an expert in the 
particular subject matter. Finally, the [circuit] court must 
evaluate the substance of the testimony and determine 
whether it is reliable. 
Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 389 S.C. 434, 446, 699 S.E.2d 169, 175 (2010). 
"Expert testimony may be used to help the jury determine a fact in issue based on 
the expert's specialized knowledge, experience, or skill and is necessary in cases in
which the subject matter falls outside the realm of ordinary lay knowledge."  Id. at
445, 699 S.E.2d at 175. 
Expert testimony differs from lay testimony in that an 
expert is permitted to state an opinion based on facts not 
within his firsthand knowledge or may base his opinion 
on information made available before the hearing so long 
as it is the type of information that is reasonably relied 
upon in the field to make opinions.  On the other hand, a 
lay witness may only testify as to matters within his 
personal knowledge and may not offer opinion testimony 
which requires special knowledge, skill, experience, or 
training. 
Id. at 445–46, 699 S.E.2d at 175. 
"[B]oth expert testimony and behavioral evidence are admissible as rape trauma 
evidence to prove a sexual offense occurred whe[n] the probative value of such 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." State v. Weaverling, 337 S.C. 460, 474, 
523 S.E.2d 787, 794 (Ct. App. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 
Schumpert, 312 S.C. 502, 506, 435 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1993)).
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Expert testimony concerning common behavioral 
characteristics of sexual assault victims and the range of 
responses to sexual assault encountered by experts is 
admissible.  Such testimony is relevant and helpful in 
explaining to the jury the typical behavior patterns of 
adolescent victims of sexual assault.  It assists the jury in 
understanding some of the aspects of the behavior of 
victims and provides insight into the abused child's often 
strange demeanor. 
Id. at 474–75, 523 S.E.2d at 794. 
In State v. White, our supreme court confirmed the admissibility of expert 
testimony and behavioral evidence in sexual abuse cases, holding such testimony 
was relevant regardless of the victim's age.  361 S.C. 407, 415, 605 S.E.2d 540, 
544 (2004). According to the court, expert testimony "may be more crucial" when 
the victims are children because their "inexperience and impressionability often 
render them unable to effectively articulate" incidents of criminal sexual abuse.  Id. 
at 414–15, 605 S.E.2d at 544. 
More recently, in State v. Brown, 411 S.C. 332, 768 S.E.2d 246 (Ct. App. 2015), 
cert. denied, (Aug. 6, 2015), this court addressed whether it was proper for an 
expert to testify regarding child sex abuse dynamics and stated the following: 
[T]he circuit court . . . found that, based on the jurors' 
qualifications and their responses to questions during voir 
dire, the empaneled jury "would not have any prior 
knowledge from family members or otherwise as to sex 
abuse directly." At trial, Appellant cross-examined the 
minor victims extensively regarding their delays in 
disclosure as well as the varying accounts of the abuse 
they gave authorities. Indeed, the minor victims delayed 
disclosing the abuse for almost three years, were unable 
to recall specific days or dates on which they were 
abused, gave varying accounts of certain instances of 
abuse, and divulged more facts each time they spoke 
about the abuse. Such behavior undoubtedly became a 
fact at issue in this case, raising questions of credibility 
or accuracy that might not be explained by experiences 
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common to jurors.  Accordingly, we find Galloway-
Williams' specialized knowledge of the behavioral 
characteristics of child sex abuse victims was relevant 
and crucial in assisting the jury's understanding of why 
children might delay disclosing sexual abuse, as well as 
why their recollections may become clearer each time 
they discuss the instances of abuse.  
Numerous jurisdictions considering this issue have 
similarly concluded it is more appropriate for an expert to 
explain the behavioral traits of child sex abuse victims to 
a jury. We believe the unique and often perplexing 
behavior exhibited by child sex abuse victims does not 
fall within the ordinary knowledge of a juror with no 
prior experience—either directly or indirectly—with 
sexual abuse. The general behavioral characteristics of 
child sex abuse victims are, therefore, more appropriate 
for an expert qualified in the field to explain to the jury, 
so long as the expert does not improperly bolster the 
victims' testimony. 
411 S.C. at 341–42, 768 S.E.2d at 251. 
In arguing Galloway-Williams' expert testimony regarding delayed disclosures and 
child sex abuse dynamics was not beyond the ordinary knowledge of the jury, 
Jones essentially mounts a direct challenge to this court's decision in Brown. We 
are not persuaded by his argument.  Galloway-Williams' testimony on these topics 
was substantially similar to her testimony in Brown, and the record indicates the 
jury in this case likewise had no experience, either directly or indirectly, with 
sexual abuse. Therefore, we decline to depart from our holding in Brown on this 
settled question of law. See id. at 342, 768 S.E.2d at 251 (stating "the unique and 
often perplexing behavior exhibited by child sex abuse victims does not fall within 
the ordinary knowledge of a juror with no prior experience—either directly or 
indirectly—with sexual abuse" and, therefore, holding it is "more appropriate for 
an expert qualified in the field to explain to the jury"). 
We further find Galloway-Williams' testimony regarding the ways in which 
nonoffending caregivers respond to sexual abuse was outside the realm of lay 
knowledge such that it was more appropriate for an expert to explain to the jury.  
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The State argues, and we agree, that "caregivers' actions seem counter-intuitive to 
people who have never experienced the horror of sexual abuse." In our view, 
without having any direct or indirect experience with the circumstances
surrounding sexual abuse, a lay juror would not understand the reasons why a 
nonoffending caregiver may not act immediately to protect a child from sexual 
abuse occurring in the home.  See generally Watson, 389 S.C. at 446, 699 S.E.2d at 
175 ("Expert testimony may be used to help the jury determine a fact in issue based 
on the expert's specialized knowledge, experience, or skill and is necessary in cases 
in which the subject matter falls outside the realm of ordinary lay knowledge.");
Weaverling, 337 S.C. at 474–75, 523 S.E.2d at 794 (stating "[e]xpert testimony 
concerning common behavioral characteristics of sexual assault victims and the 
range of responses to sexual assault encountered by experts is admissible"); see 
also State v. Tierney, 839 A.2d 38, 46–47 (N.H. 2003) (holding a police officer's 
testimony was "erroneously admitted as lay testimony" based upon the conclusion 
that he could not testify regarding the level of knowledge of a nonoffending adult 
in a child sexual assault case because such testimony "required specialized 
training, experience[,] and skill not within the ken of the ordinary person").  
Accordingly, we hold the circuit court properly admitted Galloway-Williams'
expert testimony because nonoffending caregivers' behavior in sexual abuse 
cases—like delayed disclosures and child sex abuse dynamics—is a subject 
beyond the ordinary knowledge of the jury. 
Turning to the final prong of the Watson test,2 we disagree with Jones's argument 
that the State failed to prove the reliability of Galloway-Williams' testimony and, 
more specifically, whether it was subjected to peer review.  "All expert testimony 
must satisfy the Rule 702 criteria, and that includes the [circuit] court's gatekeeping 
function in ensuring the proposed expert testimony meets a reliability threshold for 
the jury's ultimate consideration."  White, 382 S.C. at 270, 676 S.E.2d at 686.  In 
State v. Chavis, our supreme court concluded the testimony of child abuse 
assessment experts is nonscientific.  412 S.C. 101, 106, 771 S.E.2d 336, 338 
(2015). As the Chavis court noted, our courts do not follow a formulaic approach 
in determining the foundational requirements of qualifications and reliability of 
2 Because Jones does not contest Galloway-Williams' qualifications as an expert, 
we decline to address the second prong of the Watson test. See Brown, 411 S.C. at 
340 n.1, 768 S.E.2d at 250 n.1 (declining to address the second prong of Watson
because the appellant failed to challenge the expert's qualifications).
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nonscientific evidence.  Id. at 108, 771 S.E.2d at 339; see also White, 382 S.C. at 
274, 676 S.E.2d at 688 ("The foundational reliability requirement for expert 
testimony does not lend itself to a one-size-fits-all approach, for the Council
factors[3] for scientific evidence serve no useful analytical purpose when evaluating 
nonscientific expert testimony."). 
Jones primarily relies upon Chavis to support his argument that Galloway-
Williams' testimony was unreliable.  We find Chavis distinguishable, however, 
because the expert found to be unreliable in that case was qualified as a forensic 
interviewer and testified regarding the conclusions she reached after using the 
RATAC method to interview the victims.  In contrast, Galloway-Williams testified 
in general terms as to child sex abuse dynamics, focusing on delayed disclosures 
and the responses of nonoffending caregivers.  Therefore, we must determine— 
based upon the record before us—whether the circuit court properly discharged its 
gatekeeping function in determining the admissibility of Galloway-Williams'
testimony by answering the threshold question of reliability.  See generally White, 
382 S.C. at 274, 676 S.E.2d at 688 (declining to offer a "formulaic approach that 
will apply in the generality of cases" because our supreme court "d[id] not pretend 
to know the myriad of Rule 702 qualification and reliability challenges that could 
arise with respect to nonscientific expert evidence"). 
Initially, we reject Jones's argument that "Galloway-Williams could not identify or 
name a single publication or study" to support her testimony or explain whether 
any of the studies she relied upon had been peer reviewed.  A review of the record 
reveals Galloway-Williams did, in fact, identify a publication in support of her 
research. The following colloquy is instructive as to this point:
Q: 	 Let's focus on delayed disclosure as it relates to 
child victims.  You said that this information has 
been peer reviewed. Can you tell me, or can you 
3 See State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 19, 515 S.E.2d 508, 517 (1999) (stating that, in 
determining whether scientific evidence is admissible, a court should look at "(1) 
the publications and peer review of the technique; (2) prior application of the 
method to the type of evidence involved in the case; (3) the quality control 
procedures used to ensure reliability; and (4) the consistency of the method with 
recognized scientific laws and procedures"). 
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give me specific examples of studies, or studies 
that have looked at this evidence as reliable? 
A: 	 I don't have any here with me, but I could give you 
articles and studies that directly relate to delayed 
disclosure with the full citations.  It would take me 
a little bit of time to gather that up.  I didn't bring 
any of that with me. But during all of the training 
that I've been to, including the 160 hours of skills 
training and the other CEs that I have obtained 
those articles are on the basis of fact. 
Additionally, the text that I use for teaching the 
course on child maltreatment includes information 
about delayed disclosure and non-offending 
caregivers that reference these articles as well. 
Q: 	 What text is that? 
A: 	 The text is called Child Maltreatment and it is 
written by Stefanie Keen and I can't remember the 
second author. Dr. Keen is one of the professors at 
USC Upstate. 
(emphasis added). 
Galloway-Williams testified that her methods were published in articles in 
professional journals and trade publications, subjected to peer review, uniformly 
accepted and recognized within the area of child sex abuse experts and 
professionals, and relied upon for sexual abuse counseling and treatment.  
Galloway-Williams further testified that the Julie Valentine Center applies the 
same principles she explained in her testimony, and she has given multiple 
presentations on delayed disclosures and the role nonoffending caregivers play in 
the dynamics of child sexual abuse.  Likewise, Galloway-Williams confirmed that 
these types of principles were being used by counselors across the United States. 
In light of Galloway-Williams' testimony regarding her methods, we are unable to 
conclude the circuit court abused its discretion in finding Galloway-Williams' 
testimony reliable.  See, e.g., State v. Rinehart, 819 P.2d 1122, 1126 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 1991) (finding an expert's "testimony that her training and expertise are 
45 

   
acceptable in the field of sexual abuse, and that the characteristics exhibited by a 
sexually assaulted child are acceptable to and relied upon by experts in the field" 
gave rise to "a reasonable inference that [the expert]'s opinions were based upon an 
explicable and reliable system of analysis" and, thus, the defendant's argument 
"that the showing was inadequate" was not sufficient to demonstrate "the lower 
court abused its broad discretion in admitting [the expert]'s testimony").  In our 
view, the court adequately performed its gatekeeping function in ensuring the 
foundational requirements of her expert testimony were met in this case.  See 
White, 382 S.C. at 274, 676 S.E.2d at 688 (noting "[t]he foundational reliability 
requirement for expert testimony does not lend itself to a one-size-fits-all 
approach"). Therefore, we find no reversible error as to the reliability issue. 
Likewise, we reject Jones's argument that Galloway-Williams improperly bolstered 
Mother and the Victims' testimonies.  "[E]ven though experts are permitted to give 
an opinion, they may not offer an opinion regarding the credibility of others."  
State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 358, 737 S.E.2d 490, 499 (2013).  "The assessment 
of witness credibility is within the exclusive province of the jury."  State v. 
McKerley, 397 S.C. 461, 464, 725 S.E.2d 139, 141 (Ct. App. 2012).  Consequently, 
"it is improper for a witness to testify as to his or her opinion about the credibility 
of a child victim in a sexual abuse matter."  Kromah, 401 S.C. at 358–59, 737 
S.E.2d at 500. 
Jones cites several cases in support of his argument that Galloway-Williams' 
testimony was unnecessary and only offered to improperly bolster Mother and the 
Victims' testimonies.  See State v. Anderson, 413 S.C. 212, 219, 776 S.E.2d 76, 79 
(2015) (holding the circuit court committed reversible error by qualifying the 
State's witness "as an expert in child sex abuse assessment and in forensic 
interviewing" because the expert "vouched for the minor when she testified only to 
those characteristics which she observed in the minor"); Kromah, 401 S.C. at 356, 
358, 737 S.E.2d at 498–99 (finding a forensic interviewer's testimony regarding a 
"'compelling finding' of physical child abuse" problematic and stating experts "may 
not offer an opinion regarding the credibility of others"); State v. Jennings, 394 
S.C. 473, 480, 716 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2011) ("For an expert to comment on the 
veracity of a child's accusations of sexual abuse is improper."); Smith v. State, 386 
S.C. 562, 569, 689 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2010) (holding "[t]he forensic interviewer's 
hearsay testimony impermissibly corroborated the [v]ictim's identification of [the 
defendant] as the assailant, and the forensic interviewer's subsequent opinion 
testimony improperly bolstered the [v]ictim's credibility"); State v. Dawkins, 297 
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S.C. 386, 393–94, 377 S.E.2d 298, 302 (1989) (concluding the testimony of a 
psychiatrist who treated the victim was improper because the psychiatrist answered 
"yes" to solicitor's question regarding whether, based upon his examination and 
observations of the victim, he was "of the impression that [the victim's] symptoms 
[were] genuine"); McKerley, 397 S.C. at 465, 725 S.E.2d at 142 (noting the circuit 
court erred in admitting the forensic interviewer's testimony because it included 
"comments on the credibility of the victim's account of the alleged sexual assault"); 
State v. Dempsey, 340 S.C. 565, 571, 532 S.E.2d 306, 309–10 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(stating a therapist "improperly vouched for the victim's credibility by answering 
affirmatively when asked his opinion as to whether the child's symptoms of sexual
abuse were 'genuine'"). 
In Brown, however, this court clearly "distinguished improper bolstering in cases 
involving experts who themselves conducted the forensic interview from cases 
involving independent mental health experts who addressed general behavioral 
characteristics." State v. Barrett, 416 S.C. 124, 129, 785 S.E.2d 387, 389 (Ct. App. 
2016) (citing Brown, 411 S.C. at 343–45, 768 S.E.2d at 252–53).  Unlike the 
experts in the cases cited by Jones, Galloway-Williams did not testify as a forensic 
interviewer, prepare a report for her testimony, or express an opinion or belief 
regarding the credibility of the Victims' allegations in this case.  Importantly, 
Galloway-Williams never interviewed Mother or the Victims, had no knowledge of 
the facts of the case beyond her discussions with the solicitor's office prior to trial, 
and did not make any of the statements our supreme court prohibited in Kromah.4 
Thus, we find the cases Jones cited are factually and legally distinguishable from 
the instant case.  In our view, Brown is directly on point and, therefore, we analyze 
Galloway-Williams' expert testimony within the confines of that decision. 
Because Galloway-Williams never commented on the credibility of Mother or the 
Victims, but rather offered admissible expert testimony regarding the general 
behavioral characteristics of child sex abuse victims and nonoffending caregivers, 
4 See Kromah, 401 S.C. at 360, 737 S.E.2d at 500 (holding forensic interviewers 
should avoid (1) stating the child was instructed to be truthful; (2) offering a direct 
opinion on the "child's veracity or tendency to tell the truth"; (3) indirectly 
vouching for the child, "such as stating the interviewer has made a 'compelling 
finding' of abuse"; (4) indicating "the interviewer believes the child's allegations in 
the current matter"; or (5) opining "the child's behavior indicated the child was
telling the truth").
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we find her testimony did not improperly bolster their testimonies.  The fact that 
her testimony corroborated some of the Victims' reasons for delaying disclosure of 
the abuse, or Mother's failure to act when she became aware of it, does not mean 
Galloway-Williams' testimony improperly bolstered their accounts.  See Brown, 
411 S.C. at 345, 768 S.E.2d at 253 (stating "[t]he fact that [the expert's] testimony 
corroborated some of the minor victims' reasons for delaying disclosure of the 
abuse does not mean her testimony improperly bolstered their accounts"); see also 
Weaverling, 337 S.C. at 474, 523 S.E.2d at 794 ("An expert may give an opinion 
based upon personal observations or in answer to a properly framed hypothetical 
question that is based on facts supported by the record." (quoting State v. Evans, 
316 S.C. 303, 311, 450 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1994))).  Galloway-Williams merely offered 
reasons why children might delay disclosing instances of sexual abuse, as well as 
why a nonoffending caregiver may have an unusual reaction upon learning of the 
abuse, to assist the trier of fact's understanding of the complex dynamics of sexual 
abuse cases. Accordingly, we find the circuit court properly admitted Galloway-
Williams' expert testimony because she did not improperly bolster the Victims' 
testimony, or Mother's testimony, at trial. 
Finally, we reject Jones's argument that Galloway-Williams' testimony was highly 
prejudicial and cumulative.  Under Rule 403, SCRE, relevant evidence "may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice . . . or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  "Improper 
corroboration testimony that is merely cumulative to the victim's testimony, 
however, cannot be harmless, because it is precisely this cumulative effect which 
enhances the devastating impact of improper corroboration."  Jolly v. State, 314 
S.C. 17, 21, 443 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1994) (emphasis omitted).  Nevertheless, "both 
expert testimony and behavioral evidence are admissible . . . whe[n] the probative 
value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect."  Weaverling, 337 S.C. at 
474, 523 S.E.2d at 794 (quoting Schumpert, 312 S.C. at 506, 435 S.E.2d at 862).
Based upon our review of the record, we find Galloway-Williams' testimony was 
not cumulative because she did not restate or improperly corroborate Mother or the 
Victims' testimonies.  Moreover, we find the high probative value of her testimony 
outweighed any prejudicial effect on Jones's case.  See Rule 403, SCRE.  As in 
Brown, "Galloway-Williams' testimony was relevant to help the jury understand 
various aspects of victims' behavior and provided insight into the often strange 
demeanors of sexually abused children."  411 S.C. at 347, 768 S.E.2d at 254; see 
also Weaverling, 337 S.C. at 474, 523 S.E.2d at 794 (noting expert testimony 
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"assists the jury in understanding some of the aspects of the behavior of victims 
and provides insight into the abused child's often strange demeanor").  Her 
"testimony was also crucial in explaining to the jury why child sex abuse victims 
are often unable to effectively relay incidents of criminal sexual abuse."  Brown, 
411 S.C. at 347, 768 S.E.2d at 254; see also White, 361 S.C. at 414–15, 605 S.E.2d 
at 544 (noting "[t]he inexperience and impressionability of children often render 
them unable to effectively articulate the events giving rise to criminal sexual 
behavior"). Further, her testimony assisted in explaining the various reactions a 
nonoffending caregiver may have when learning about sexual abuse occurring in 
the home. 
As noted above, Galloway-Williams did not repeat Mother or the Victims' 
allegations, vouch for their credibility, or make any statements that improperly 
corroborated their testimonies.  Further, she was not qualified as an expert in 
forensic interviewing. Thus, as this court stated in Brown, 
the concerns our supreme court expressed in Kromah
regarding forensic interviewers testifying as experts in 
child sexual abuse cases are inapplicable to the instant 
case because the danger of prejudice—which could 
result from the jury giving undue weight to the expert 
testimony of a forensic interviewer who interviews the 
victim and expresses an opinion as to the child's
credibility—is simply not present here. 
411 S.C. at 348, 768 S.E.2d at 254.  Accordingly, we find the circuit court properly 
admitted Galloway-Williams' expert testimony because her testimony did not 
improperly corroborate Mother or the Victims' testimony, was not cumulative, and 
its probative value substantially outweighed any prejudice Jones experienced from 
its submission to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the circuit court's judgment is 
AFFIRMED.5 
5 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 
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MCDONALD, J.:  Jason Randall Morgan appeals the circuit court's order 
awarding restitution, arguing the settlement of the initial civil action between 
Morgan and Victim as well as Victim's signing of a covenant not to execute bars 
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restitution as a condition of Appellant's probationary sentence.  We disagree and 
affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 21, 2010, Jason Randall Morgan (Morgan) caused an automobile 
accident with Elizabeth Morales-Molina (Victim), generating both a civil claim for 
damages by Victim and a criminal prosecution against Morgan for felony driving 
under the influence (DUI). Victim sustained significant injuries, including a 
broken arm, a broken hip, and broken ribs.  On November 18, 2010—independent 
of the criminal case—Victim and Morgan's insurance company settled the civil suit 
and entered a Covenant Not to Execute (Covenant).  Pursuant to the Covenant, 
Morgan's insurance company agreed to pay $25,000, the primary liability 
insurance policy's limit.  The Covenant reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Notwithstanding any judgment that may be rendered in 
any such lawsuit, it is the express intent of the parties that 
Covenantee [Morgan], his/her/its/their agents, 
representatives, heirs and assigns, shall never at any time, 
be liable to Covenantor [Victim], his/her subrogees, 
agents, representatives, heirs or assigns, beyond the 
consideration expressed herein and paid, by reason of any 
damages or injuries on which such judgment may be 
based except as herein stated.  In consideration of the 
payment to [Victim] of the aforementioned sum
[$25,000], [Victim], his/her subrogees, agents, 
representatives, heirs or assigns, shall not at any time, nor 
shall anyone for them or in their behalf, enforce against 
Covenantee, by execution or otherwise, any judgment 
that may be rendered in any such lawsuit except as herein 
stated. Further, immediately upon reduction to judgment 
of any such lawsuit, Covenantor, his/her subrogees, 
agents, representatives, heirs or assigns, will provide 
Covenantee with an executed satisfaction of said 
judgment.  Moreover, this COVENANT or a photocopy 
hereof shall be considered and serve as a satisfaction of 
any such judgment in any claim or lawsuit presented by 
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[Victim] against [Morgan] for the aforementioned 
vehicular collision or incident, and can be recorded as 
such should Covenantor, his/her subrogees, agents, 
representatives, heirs or assigns fail to execute a 
Satisfaction of Judgment. 
The Covenant expressly reserved Victim's right to bring suit against Morgan and/or 
any excess liability and/or underinsured motorist insurer.  Further, the Covenant 
states "Covenantor, Covenantee and insurer expressly reserve all rights of action, 
claims, demands or other legal remedies against all firms, persons or entities of any 
nature or kind, except as modified by the terms of this COVENANT.  This
COVENANT is not a release, nor shall it be construed as a release of any party, 
person, firm or corporation." 
On June 27, 2013, Morgan pled guilty to assault and battery in the second degree 
and was sentenced to a prison term of three years, suspended upon service of three 
years' probation. After eighteen months' probation, the sentence could be 
terminated upon payment of all associated collections.   
At an October 3, 2013 restitution hearing, the State requested that Victim be 
awarded restitution of $238,660.10 for outstanding medical bills related to her 
treatment for injuries sustained in the accident. Morgan opposed restitution, 
arguing the Covenant operated to release Morgan's responsibility for any payment 
other than the $25,000 paid to settle the initial liability claim.  The circuit court 
ordered restitution of $238,660.10 on December 17, 2013.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A sentence will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion when the ruling is 
based on an error of law."  State v. Dawson, 402 S.C. 160, 163, 740 S.E.2d 501, 
502 (2013). 
In State v. Gulledge, our supreme court explained, "[T]he restitution hearing is part 
of the sentencing proceeding."  326 S.C. 220, 228, 487 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1997); see 
S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-322(A) (2014) ("[I]n addition to any other sentence which 
it may impose, the court shall order the defendant make restitution . . . ." (emphasis 
added)); see also United States v. Anglian, 784 F.2d 765, 769 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 841 (1986) (a restitution order is in the nature of a sentence, and 
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the district court is vested with wide discretion in determining the appropriate 
sentence for a convicted defendant).  "Therefore, during the restitution hearing, the 
rules governing sentencing proceedings should apply."  Gulledge, 326 S.C. at 229, 
487 S.E.2d at 595; see Harris v. Alabama, 542 So.2d 1312, 1314 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1989) (explaining because restitution is not intended to be a civil action, a 
restitution hearing shall be governed by the same rules as a sentencing hearing; 
therefore, any evidence the court deems to have probative value may be received 
regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence).  "When a question of 
law is presented, our standard of review is plenary."  State v. Cochran, 369 S.C. 
308, 312–13, 631 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
 
Morgan argues the circuit court erred in awarding restitution because (1) Victim 
signed a waiver of any further recovery from Appellant and (2) the court failed to 
consider the award in light of S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-322(B) and (C) (2014).   
 
When a defendant is convicted of a crime causing pecuniary damages or loss to a 
victim, section 17-25-322(A) of the South Carolina Code (2014) requires that the 
court hold a hearing to determine the amount of restitution due the victim as a 
result of the defendant's criminal acts.  "[I]n addition to any other sentence which 
[the court] may impose, the court shall order the defendant make restitution or 
compensate the victim for any pecuniary damages."  S.C. Code Ann. §17-25-
322(A) (emphasis added). 
 
Additionally, section 16-3-1110(12) of the South Carolina Code (2015) states:  
 
"Restitution" means payment for all injuries, specific 
losses, and expenses sustained by a crime victim 
resulting from an offender's criminal conduct.  It 
includes, but is not limited to: 
 
(i) medical and psychological counseling expenses; 
(ii) specific damages and economic losses; 
(iii) funeral expenses and related costs; 
(iv) vehicle impoundment fees; 
(v) child care costs; and 
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(vi) transportation related to a victim's participation in the 
criminal justice process. 
 
Restitution does not include awards for pain and 
suffering, wrongful death, emotional distress, or loss of 
consortium. 
 
Restitution orders do not limit any civil claims a crime 
victim may file. 
 
South Carolina has never directly addressed the question of whether a settlement 
and covenant not to execute between a victim and defendant prior to sentencing 
precludes restitution, but courts in other jurisdictions have considered the issue.  
As in the case at bar, in Kirby v. State, 863 So.2d 238, 240 (Fla. 2003), Kirby 
caused a traffic accident and settled victim's civil suit against him with the $25,000 
policy limits from his automobile insurance policy.  Kirby opposed restitution 
because the settlement agreement contained a release of liability.  Id. at 241. The 
Florida supreme court discussed the purpose of restitution in the criminal context, 
explaining, "Unlike a civil claim for damages, the purpose of restitution is twofold: 
(1) to compensate the victim and (2) to serve the rehabilitative, deterrent, and 
retributive goals of the criminal justice system."  Id. at 242. Ultimately, the Kirby 
court held, "Because civil settlements and criminal restitution are distinct remedies 
with differing considerations, we hold that a settlement and release of liability on a 
civil claim for damages between private parties does not prohibit the trial court 
from fulfilling its mandatory obligation to order restitution in the criminal case."  
Id. at 240.1    
1 The Kirby decision provides for offset in the case of a civil settlement, noting:  
"the amount of restitution shall be set off against any civil recovery, reflecting the 
Legislature's recognition that although the restitution obligation is primary, the 
victim should not receive a double recovery." Id. at 243; see Fla. Stat. § 775.089(8) 
("An order of restitution hereunder will not bar any subsequent civil remedy or 
recovery, but the amount of such restitution shall be set off against any subsequent 
independent civil recovery."). South Carolina law does not contain a provision 
requiring offset but as restitution is an equitable remedy, it would be reasonable to 
award an offset of the $25,000 paid by the liability carrier.  Here, however, the 
medical bills remain outstanding. Victim's civil attorney did not negotiate with the 
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Other courts have held that a release of liability cannot foreclose the State's ability 
to seek restitution if the State was not a party to the agreement.  See State v. 
Iniguez, 821 P.2d 194, 197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (stating the distinction between 
civil damages and restitution means that a victim's release of civil liability does not 
prevent the court from ordering the criminal law remedy of restitution); see also 
Fore v. State, 858 So.2d 982, 986 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (same); People v. 
Maxich, 971 P.2d 268, 270 (Colo. App. 1998) (same); State v. Applegate, 976 
P.2d 936, 938 (Kan. 1999) (holding the State was not a party to the settlement 
agreement, therefore, a civil release of claims does not and cannot specifically 
preclude court-ordered restitution in a criminal case); People v. Bernal, 101 Cal. 
App. 4th 155, 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (same); State v. DeAngelis, 747 A.2d 289, 
295 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (same); State v. Belfry, 416 N.W.2d 811, 813 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding "the state is not barred from seeking, or the court 
from imposing, reasonable restitution" even though the victims received a 
settlement); Urias v. State, 987 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Tex. App. 1999) ("[T]he
settlement on behalf of the injured party with the insurance company was not a bar 
to the trial court ordering restitution as a condition of probation."). 
These holdings are consistent with the language of South Carolina's restitution 
statutes, which permit, but do not require, a sentencing judge to consider factors 
such as the defendant's resources, the victim's resources, rehabilitative effect, and 
the hardship on the victim.  See S.C. Code § 17-25-322(B).  In contrast, upon the 
finding of a defendant's simple negligence, a civil judgment concerns only the 
victim's damages and is not limited to pecuniary loss.  Thus, we agree with the 
Kirby court's reasoning that the constructs of restitution and civil damages are
separate and distinct. 
Finally, the plain language of the Covenant does not preclude further litigation 
between the parties, let alone restitution in the criminal court.  The Covenant 
contemplates Victim's pursuit of further legal remedies and, as the circuit court 
providers, and the medical liens had not been addressed at the time of the
restitution hearing. 
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found, nothing in the agreement itself extinguished the possibility of restitution in 
the criminal matter.2 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the circuit court's restitution award. 
AFFIRMED. 

SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
	
2 Morgan further argues the circuit court failed to consider the factors enumerated
in section 17-25-322 in reaching the restitution figure.  We find this argument 
unpreserved for our review.  See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 
S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be 
preserved for appellate review.").  The applicable restitution statutes, however, 
permit a defendant to petition the trial court for the modification of its order and 
consideration of these factors. See, e.g. S.C. Code § 17-25-323(A) (Supp. 2015) 
(stating the trial court retains jurisdiction for purpose of modifying the manner in 
which court-ordered payments are made) and S.C. Code § 17-25-326 (2014) ("Any 
court order issued pursuant to the provisions of this article may be altered, 
modified, or rescinded upon the filing of a petition by the defendant, Attorney 
General, solicitor, or victim for good and sufficient cause shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence."). 
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